INTRODUCTION 19
Infrastructure systems such as electricity, water and transportation form the backbone of modern societies 20 (UNISDR 2015) . These are organised in networks of assets which facilitate the flow of resources and the delivery 21 of services (Zio 2016) . To study the emerging behaviour of infrastructure systems, the graph-theoretic 22 techniques, originally developed in the field of statistical mechanics (Barabasi & Albert 2002) , are being used 23 increasingly. In a graph model of an infrastructure network, the nodes represent the components where the 24 service is generated or delivered and the edges represent the distribution channels (Table 1 ). The size of these 25 networks varies considerably, for example, from potable water distribution networks which can be organised in 26 small local networks (Dueñas-Osorio et al. 2007 ) with less than one hundred components, to the power grids 27 with tens of thousands of nodes (Albert et al. 2004) . A review of infrastructure systems analysis is given in 28 (Ouyang 2014) . 29
Whilst large-scale analyses of infrastructure systems are important to assess systemic risks (Lorenz et al. 2009 ), 30 these can mask local criticalities. Evaluating the behaviour of the system at different levels of granularities allows 31 for local information to emerge. This is particularly important for infrastructure systems that have multiple 32 stakeholders each concerned with the performance at a different scale as shown in Figure 1 . These scales may 33 be hierarchical but this is not necessarily true for all of the infrastructures; some infrastructures go beyond 34 regional or national boundaries to serve multiple regions across different nations (as is the case of the European 35 Gas Network (Poljansek et al. 2012) ). Further, they may be of interest to consumer (or industry) associations that 36 operate at any of the intermediate scales shown in Figure 1 . 37
As an example, the storm surge in February 2014 in the UK that washed away 80 meters of railway line in 38 Dawlish (Network Rail 2014), could be considered a minor event from a whole-system perspective because the 39 station represents only 0.02% of the annual network throughput (Office of Rail and Road 2015). From a local 40 perspective, however, the damage was unacceptable, as it completely cut off the region from the rest of the 41 national railway network. It is not unusual for each stakeholder to be concerned with the functionality of the 42 system at a particular scale. Planning in a multi-stakeholder environment requires the right tools so that the 43 performance of each of the parts can be assessed with clarity at the onset of the process (Blockley & Godfrey 44 2000) and stakeholders are able to have a meaningful discussion about the system criticalities. 45
The objective of this paper is to provide tools to foster such a discussion among stakeholders with a diverse 46 range of priorities. To achieve this, new metrics to identify the critical elements of an infrastructure system at 47 multiple scales are proposed. The paper is organised as follows: first, it reviews the approaches to identify 48 communities in a infrastructure network; Then, it defines two new metrics to assess the performance of 49 communities and explores their behaviour for different network parameters; in the following section, it introduces 50 a third new metric to account for multiple levels of community structure within the system; a Case Study is then 51 presented to demonstrate the application of the new metrics to a model of the Great Britain railway system 52 before conclusions are drawn in the final section. 53 LITERATURE REVIEW 54 COMMUNITY DETECTION 55 In an effort to better map the behaviour of the system to the needs of its stakeholders, the concept of network 56 community is used. Network communities can be defined as "locally dense connected subgraphs in a network" 57 . In an infrastructure system, community structure emerges because it is required to achieve a 58 thorough distribution of service at the local level, while guaranteeing whole-system connectivity through efficient, 59 but scarce, long-range communication channels. The elements of an infrastructure system community are much 60 more likely to interact with each other than with the rest of the system when delivering their service to society. 61 Electric power, for example, is produced and distributed at the local level whenever possible, with long-range 62 transmission (i.e. at a national scale or above) being the costly alternative to be used when local generation 63 capacity cannot satisfy peaks in demand (Mureddu et al. 2015) . 64
Community detection is the process of identifying any partitions that may exist in a network, and a partition is a 65 subdivision of a network in communities. Community detection on networks is a fertile research field and there 66 exist several alternative procedures that can be used for this purpose (Fortunato 2010 ). The Stability 67 Optimisation (SO) method described in (Delvenne et al. 2010 ) and implemented in (Le Martelot & Hankin 2011) 68 was selected here (see Appendix A). 69 SO leverages the association between graphs and random walk processes. Any graph can be associated to a 70 random walk process where the transition probabilities are proportional to the edge weights. The groups of 71 nodes that a random walker is unlikely to leave, because of the number and the quality of the connections 72 between them, become basins of attraction and are referred to as communities. Partitions are identified by 73 maximising stability, which is the likelihood that a random walk of length t, referred to as scale parameter, 74 terminates in the same community where it started (see (Lambiotte 2010) for the full derivation). When the length 75 of the random walk is set to 1, SO corresponds to the widely used Modularity Optimisation methods (Newman & 76 Girvan 2004) and by changing the length t of the random walk, it allows the discovery of partitions in which the 77 size of communities is above or below the resolution limit of modularity (Fortunato & Barthelemy 2007) . Each 78 value of t can be associated to a different partition. To discern partitions between those actually characterising 79 the system and those that are only a product of the algorithm sweeping through t values, it is necessary to 80 assess their robustness against small perturbations such as small increments in the length of the random walk t 81 in the algorithmic procedure (this is different from the robustness of operations within a network or community). 82
Partitions identified for an adequate range of values of t are considered robust and used in the analysis. There 83 are other methods sharing the features of SO, such as (Danon et al. 2006 ) and (Reichardt & Bornholdt 2006) , 84 but they will not be discussed here. The choice of the community detection method does not affect the 85 development of the metrics presented here, as long as it is able to deliver a sequence of partitions. 86
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORK SCIENCE

87
Network science methodologies, such as Community Detection, are powerful tools to examine the system-level 88 performance of infrastructure networks (e.g. their robustness) or of their constituent elements (e.g. the criticality 89 of individual nodes or edges). An infrastructure domain where network science has had significant success is 90 that of transportation networks. 91
For example, it has been shown that in road networks the betweenness centrality distribution of their nodes 92 shows heavy tails (Lämmer et al. 2006 ). The betweenness centrality of a node is the fraction of shortest paths 93 going through it (Borgatti 2005) . As the cost of going from origin to destination is proportional to the distance 94 travelled (in absence of congestion), shortest paths represent the preferred choice for the users of the network. 95
As such, betweenness centrality has been used as an indicator of the flow of service going through the nodes of 96 an infrastructure network. This is also supported by the correlation of betweenness centrality and economic 97 activity identified by (Strano et al. 2007 ), as economic activity in urban areas is known to attract vehicle traffic. 98
The fact that the betweenness centrality distribution is heavy-tailed highlights the disproportionate amount of 99 traffic that some parts of the road network attract from the peripheral regions. Vulnerability analyses have also 100 been performed using network science as the overarching framework: for example investigating the robustness 101 of an Italian road network with respect to the loss of its road links (Zio et al. 2011) or assessing the systemic 102 impact of multiple hazards on a transportation network in New Zealand (Dalziell & Nicholson 2001) . 103
Topological studies of railway networks investigated their structure both at the national (Dunn et al. 2016; Sen et  104  at the national level, these networks show compact degree distributions, when the models are extended to the  120   continental scale and beyond, the distribution becomes a power law, highlighting the role of hub airports in long  121   distance connectivity. Further, as links do not represent physical entities but flight routes, two different  122 representations can be used, as in the case of railway networks: models can be built either of the networks 123 connecting the airports, or of the networks operated by single airlines (DeLaurentis et al. 2008) . 124
The vulnerability of these networks to disruptions has become of interest for the research community in the 125 aftermath of the 2011 eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano, which caused the inoperability of the northern part 126 of the European Air Transportation network for six days, affecting 10 around million travellers (Bye 2011 Network and found that it has a scale-free degree distribution with an exponential cut-off, with most of its hub 129 nodes located in the northern part of the system. This makes the network vulnerable to spatially concentrated 130 hazards, such as aforementioned eruption, as a relatively spatially concentrated disruptive event has the 131 potential to affect airports outside of it, effectively having a much larger footprint. 132
In general, there are two distinct traditions for vulnerability of transport networks -one, based on topological 133 studies and the other based on demand and supply. A review of both these approaches is provided in (Mattsson 134 and Jenelius 2015) where they also highlight the importance of collaborations between authorities, operators and 135 researchers to improve the resilience of transport networks. The role of connectivity has also been reviewed in 136 (Reggiani et al. 2015) . In this paper, we provide new perspectives on the identification of critical elements using 137 the concept of communities while addressing the needs of a variety of stakeholders. 138
COMMUNITY DETECTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS
139
Community detection has mostly been used in the infrastructure systems research literature to reduce the 140 computational complexity of the problem under scrutiny. In (Mena et al. 2014 ) an affinity-based community 141 detection procedure was used to arrive at the most efficient configuration for an electric power system. In 142 (Gómez et al. 2014 ) a version of Markov Chain clustering was used to provide coarser, yet faster, assessment of 143 damage propagation through a highway system. A different point of view was taken in Marquez 2011) and (Fang & Zio 2013) where modularity optimisation and hierarchical spectral partitioning were 145 used respectively for the common goal of identifying system criticalities based on the position within the clusters 146 of system elements. In these works (and those reported in Table 1 ), however, critical nodes are identified from 147 the perspective of the whole system; the consequences of their impairment are never computed at the 148 community level, the perspective taken in this paper. In this paper we also show how to integrate a global 149 analysis with the information obtained at the community level. We assume that a community structure is present 150 which is often the case with infrastructure systems. 151
COMMUNITY-BASED METRICS
152
In this section, we build new performance metrics for communities drawing upon the idea of node centrality in 153 weighted graphs. 154
GLOBAL CENTRALITY
155
The cost of delivering a service from generation to distribution is an important metric to assess the viability of an 156 infrastructure. It is assumed here that such cost is univocal for an infrastructure network in its design state, and 157 further that the design state of the system is characterised by the service being routed through the shortest paths 158 between the generation and the distribution point. This represents a best-case scenario for agents operating 159 infrastructure systems, as the cost incurred in running these networks is proportional to the distance over which 160 the service is delivered. While it is not always possible to route the service along the shortest paths due to the 161 finite capacity of the network components, this assumption provides a baseline to understand the structure of the 162 system. 163
Let G=(N,M) be the graph representing the network infrastructure of interest, with N being the node set and M 164 being the edge set. The cardinalities of such sets are respectively n and m. The average shortest path D 165 between two nodes of the system is equal to: 166
(1) 167
where dij is the shortest path between origin node i and destination node j. In the design state of the network the 168 average cost of delivering service across the system is proportional to the average shortest path. However, when 169 two nodes are disconnected the distance between them tends to infinity and the average cost diverges, too. In 170 order to circumvent this issue, the average efficiency E of a network has been proposed in ( (2) 173
With this formulation, when two nodes become disconnected and the distance between them tends to infinity, the 174 efficiency between them 1/dij drops to zero, making it possible to account for disconnected components. 175
Efficiency is thus a suitable indicator of infrastructure system performance; it contains information about the 176 operability of the system while also being computable on disconnected graphs. Besides network efficiency, other 177 performance indicators can be devised, such as the connectivity among the set of nodes where the service is 178 produced and those where the service is delivered ( (Murray et al. 2008), (Johansson & Hassel 2014)) or the 179 total network throughput (Ouyang et al. 2009 ), but in this paper the discussion is limited to efficiency and its 180 application to a network partitioned in communities. 181
When the system is stressed by removing a node (or an edge), the efficiency of the system reduces as shortest 182 paths originally going through the removed node (or edge) become longer. This efficiency drop can be used to 183 represent the degradation of the system performance. Computing the efficiency drop allows for a representation 184 of performance that does not simply assess whether the nodes are connected, but also accounts for the quality 185 of those connections. The efficiency drop associated to the removal of a node is defined Information Centrality 186 (Latora & Marchiori 2007) and in this paper it is labelled as global centrality, GC, to underscore its global nature: 187
where E 0 is the efficiency of the network in its original configuration and E k is the efficiency of the network after 189 the removal of node k. It has been shown for several systems (e.g. (Dunn & Wilkinson 2013) , (Ouyang 2013) and 190 (Fang et al. 2015) ) that there is a good correlation between the critical elements identified with network metrics 191 such as GC and more physically accurate engineering-based models. 192
GC is an indicator that expresses the criticality of nodes for the operations of the whole infrastructure system. 193
Therefore, it caters only to the need of stakeholders that are concerned with the operations of the entire network, 194 such as the system operators. Next section provides them with new metrics to assess the local importance of 195 infrastructure assets. 196
INTRACOMMUNITY AND INTERCOMMUNITY CENTRALITIES
Once the network is partitioned into network communities, it is possible to de-average network efficiency E and 199 introduce a Community Efficiency matrix CE. The elements of CE are computed as follows: 200
where dkl is the shortest path between origin node k and destination node l, nci and ncj are the number of nodes in 202 communities i and j, and δij is the Kronecker delta function required to adjust the total number of (i,j) pairs when 203 the origin and destination communities are the same. Each CEij element represents the efficiency of 204 communication between community i and community j in the current configuration of the system. The diagonal 205 elements of CE map the efficiency within communities, whereas the extra-diagonal elements reflect how efficient 206 the connection of each community to the rest of the system is. This allows for a first comparison among 207 communities; it is possible to assess whether any of them is underperforming its peers and, if necessary, 208 improve its internal or external efficiency. We are not suggesting that all communities should have an equal level 209 of efficiency, as their development at the local level is demand-driven, but the use of CE in conjunction with the 210 requirements on the different communities of the system would allow for a transparent discussion among system 211 stakeholders about what improvement each community needs. 
where CEij k is the efficiency between communities i and j after the removal of node k, and c is the total number of 218 communities in the system. These two indicators provide the same kind of information as GC, but at the local 219 level. By leveraging the local average defined by Equation 4, the two indicators identify how much the node they 220 refer to is important for the operations of those communities. IC expresses how critical a node is internally for the 221 community where it belongs, whereas EC expresses how the removal of the same node influences the 222 transactions between that community and the rest of the system. Figure 2 It should be noted that EC averages the impact of the node removal over all of the communities, rather than 229 focusing only on the community where the disrupted node originally belonged to. This allows the criticality 230 analysis to maintain a global perspective, as the disruption of a node within a community has the potential to 231 affect other communities at the same time, in terms of their efficiency with respect to the rest of the system. The 232 focus on the individual community could be restored whenever necessary by restricting the computation of EC 233 exclusively to those paths between the nodes of the community under investigation and the rest of the system. 234
Ranking the nodes of a community according to their IC and EC values highlights which of them are the most 235 critical for its efficiency. Comparing the different values of IC and EC across different communities allows for an 236 assessment of which communities are dependent on a few nodes and which are most robust to such 237 perturbations. Further, since IC and EC are community level properties, these do not suggest where the node 238 with highest value of IC or EC is located within a community. 239
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
240
The IC and EC metrics depend on the local structure of the community, expressed by variables such as its size 241 and edge density, as well as the global topological parameters such as the total number of communities and the 242 number of connections between them. The behaviour of the newly proposed metrics was examined through 243 synthetic networks with pre-defined community structure. The purpose was to explore which parameters affect 244 the two metrics and thus understand which modifications to infrastructure networks would be the most favourable 245 for maintaining the efficiency of the communities when their nodes are disrupted. 246
The numerical experiments were carried out in a Matlab programming environment (Mathworks 2017), using the 247 MatlabBGL library as a support for component identification, the Graph Theory Toolbox for shortest path 248 computations and the Community Detection Toolbox for its implementation of the Stability Optimisation 249 algorithm. 250
The synthetic networks were generated with the Girvan-Newman (GN) model (Newman & Girvan 2004) for 251 reasons given subsequently. The GN model requires the specification of the number of communities c, the 252 number of nodes in each community n1, the average number of edges each node has within the same 253 community zi, and the average number of edges every node has outside of its community ze. The GN model 254 assigns each node a community at the start of the process. 255
In each realisation of the model, edges are generated with likelihood pi=zi/(n1-1) between nodes of the same 256 community and with likelihood pe=ze/(n1*(c-1)) between nodes of different communities. The GN model generates 257 communities which have an intercommunity degree distribution following that of the Erdos-Renyi (ER) random 258 graph model (Erdos & Renyi 1959) , with a few extra connections between the communities. Random inter-community centrality of its nodes, and this size effect is much stronger than the effect of the internal 303 connectivity. For example, when zi = 2, the median value of IC obtained for communities with n1 = 12 is 0.54 304 times the value obtained for communities with n1 = 6, i.e. upon doubling the size of the community, the median IC 305 roughly halves. When the number of internal edges per node doubles, however, the median value IC stays about 306 the same; for n1 = 6, doubling the average number of internal edges per nodes from 2 to 4 yields a reduction of 307 IC of only 5.13%. Increasing the local connectivity of smaller communities is not a viable alternative to cope with 308 their inherent lack of redundancy: the operations of these communities are much more susceptible to any 309 disruption simply because of their small size, and as such they need to be treated carefully by the system 310 owners. 311
Panel E and Panel F allow for some final insights: first, as it would be expected, the total number of communities 312 c in the system does not influence sensibly the median value of IC, while the average number of external edges 313 per node ze does. The median value of EC, on the other hand, is influenced by both c and ze. 314
CROSS-SCALE CENTRALITY
315
The two new community metrics, IC and EC defined above, account for the criticality of a system component at 316 one particular scale. However, the capacity of infrastructure systems to deliver service can be evaluated at 317 multiple scales, each represented by the different partitions identified during community detection. A node found 318 to be critical at most scales would be of interest to all stakeholders. In order to allow for an assessment of 319 component criticality across scales, a third metric, cross-scale centrality XC, is introduced here. It is obtained for 320 every node by averaging over all partitions a linear combination of its normalised IC and EC values. The 321 normalisation is done with respect to the maximum value in the each community. 322
For node k belonging to communities i1, i2, …, inp in the np different partitions considered in the analysis, XC can 323 be written as: 324
where max(IC)ij is the maximum value of IC in community ij where node k belongs in the j th partition, and the 326 same for EC. In order for XC to be bounded between 0 and 1, coefficient in Equation (7) The weights γj can be applied to the results obtained at every scale to emphasize the information yielded by 333 some partitions, reflecting the power dynamics between the stakeholders interested in functionality at that scale. 334
For example, if a partition is of particular interest because budgeting for the infrastructure system is done at a 335 comparable scale, then it can be weighted more heavily than others. 336 XC has the highest values for those nodes that are critical at multiple scales of system description, while having 337 low or average values otherwise. Once XC has been obtained, it can be used in conjunction with GC to express 338 the criticality of the network elements from both a global and a local perspective. The advantage of using XC 339 consists in having a clearer view of the different stakeholder needs. By accounting for all the scales at which the 340 system delivers its service, XC facilitates the discussion among stakeholders about which sections of the network 341 require additional investments. If it is considered sufficient, only one partition can be used (for example to 342 represent the interplay between the national and regional performance of a railway system), and in that case XC 343 reduces to a linear combination of the intra-and inter-community centralities. 344
As noted previously, EC metric in its current form averages out the impact across all communities in a partition. 345
However, our objective has been to capture both the local and global impacts of a disruptive event and metric XC 346 enables the restoration of information that might not be fully considered at one level of system description. Optimisation used here. In the case of infrastructure systems, however, it is not an obstacle, rather it is an 350 opportunity to tailor the analysis to the needs of the stakeholders. Community detection is used here to highlight 351 the criticality of network components for multiple levels of system organisation. If the decision-maker requires 352 accounting for a plurality of stakeholder needs, community detection can be used to yield a higher number of 353 partitions by relaxing the requirements for a partition to be identified. Conversely, if too many partitions are 354 deemed to make the analysis too complex, then requirements that are more stringent can be set. An example of 355 how Stability Optimisation can be tuned to yield a different number of partitions is provided when the Case Study 356 is presented. Practical and system-dependent considerations might also guide the choice of the number of 357 partitions to use in the analysis. For example, when assessing a water distribution network, the analysis can be 358 limited to partitions characterised by communities not smaller than neighbourhoods served by the same pumping Table A1  371 in Appendix A for a list of stations) and m = 270 edges connecting them through the railway lines. The weights 372 assigned to the edges reflect the minimum travel time between the nodes they connect. Such a measure was 373 chosen over the physical distance between two stations because it represents a more realistic proxy of the cost 374 of travel: it implicitly includes non-spatial constraints such as the maximum speed of the vehicles and the 375 capacity of the lines. Data regarding travel time between adjacent stations was obtained from the National Rail 376 website. Figure 4 shows the frequency distribution of nodal degrees in Panel A, while Panel B shows the fit of the 377 degree distribution to a Poisson Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). Table 2 illustrates the main topological 378 features of the system. 379 Table 3 reports the global centrality values for the ten highest-ranking nodes of the system and Figure 5 plots the 380 distribution of GC on the whole system. Seven out of the ten most central nodes according to GC are located in 381 the London region or in the immediate vicinity (Nodes 97, 98, 99, 100 101 and 109 are located in London, Node 382 105 is adjacent to it), reflecting the role of the city in the national railway system. As a large number of shortest 383 paths between the nodes of the system go through the London region, any disruption to these nodes has the 384 potential to reduce significantly the efficiency of the network. The only three peripheral nodes that make it in the 385 list, namely Exeter, Preston and York (Nodes 135, 32 and 38), are bottlenecks for their communities. Exeter is 386 the node governing the accessibility to the whole of Devon and Cornwall, whereas Preston and York lie 387 respectively on the East and West coastal paths from to the North of England and Scotland: the efficiency of 388 paths towards these three large regions of the system depend on them. These are the only peripheral nodes that 389 rank as high as the London nodes in a global analysis: a global metric such as global information centrality 390 discounts the importance that other nodes have at the community level. 391
COMMUNITY DETECTION
392
The communities on the railway network were identified using the Stability Optimisation: the results of community 393 detection are presented in Figure 6 , where the number of communities identified during each run of stability 394 optimisation is plotted in Panel A against the value of the scale parameter t. The algorithm was run 100 times for 395 values of t in the [0:1] interval and 100 times in the [1:100] interval. The value t = 1 was chosen as the threshold 396 between the two regimes because for t = 1 the optimisation of stability and modularity are equivalent: below 1 397 stability optimisation finds partitions finer than the resolution limit, while above it yields larger partitions. 398
For every value of the scale parameter t, stability optimisation yields a partition. Plateaus in the stability plot 399 correspond to partitions identified during consecutive runs of the community detection procedure. The larger the 400 plateau, the more robust the partition. In order to discriminate between partitions that are simply a product of the 401 algorithm sweeping through different t values and those that represent functional subsystems within the network, 402 robustness threshold, the number nt of successive values of t for which a partition is identified, is used (Lambiotte 403 2010 Table 4 . 411
The number of communities in each partitions varies from 26 to 3, and the average number of nodes goes from 5 412 nodes in P1 to 49 nodes in P6. 413 P6 is at the opposite end of the spectrum: it is the coarsest subdivision identified by stability optimisation, and 419 consists of only three communities (Figure 7, Panel B) . They are articulated around London, as the city is a 420 gateway to access the North of England, and splits the South in a region that is extremely well connected to it 421 (the South-East) and one where the network is sparser (the South-West). The remaining six partitions have sizes 422 in between P1 and P6, and in the following P4 is examined in greater detail. Partition P4 is identified at t = 1 and by 423 inspecting its communities and the nodes belonging to them, it is possible to assess the similarity between the 11 424 regions of Great Britain and the 9 communities of P4, both shown in Figure 8 . The boundaries of Community C4, 425 for example, largely correspond to those of Scotland (region 1), while Community C8 is constituted by the nodes 426 that model the London (region 8) railway stations, and Community C7 covers the whole of the South-West of 427 England (region 10). 428
This correspondence can be quantified by the Normalised Mutual Information (NMI) (Danon et al. 2006) . Given 429 two partitions X and Y, NMI(X,Y) is the amount of information that is gained about one by knowing the other: in 430 this case it is used to represent the overlap between the partition found by the algorithm (say, partition X) and the 431 regional structure of the network (say, partition Y). NMI is computed as: 432
where the summation is performed over all communities represented by x and y, p(x,y) is, for each community in 434 partition X, the number of nodes belonging to the corresponding community in partition Y, and p(x) and p(y) the 435 number of the nodes in those communities according to the two partitions. NMI is bounded between 0 and 1. 436
Between Partition P4 and the regional subdivision of Great Britain a value of NMI = 0.714 is obtained. The 1% 437 significance value of NMI computed with a permutation test is equal to 0.189. Such a test was performed by 438 generating 10 4 random partitions for a network with 148 nodes and 11 communities, and computing the 99 th 439 percentile of the distribution of NMI between each of the synthetic partitions and P4. A value of 0.714 reflects the 440 high level of similarity between the two partitions: the community detection algorithm is thus able to detect the 441 regional structure of the railway system. 442
Where the partitions do not overlap, however, additional insight can be gained on the functionality of the system 443 by inspecting it. One example is the North of Wales. While it is operated as part of the Welsh railway network, 444 community detection shows that it belongs to the same basin of attraction as the North East of England. 445 Community detection highlights the fact that for its operations this part of Wales depends on the North East of 446 England, and therefore it might be more effectively managed as part of the adjacent community. 447
INTRACOMMUNITY AND INTERCOMMUNITY CENTRALITIES
448
The community efficiency matrix CE of the railway network for the 9-community partition P4 is shown in Figure 9 . 449
The diagonal elements are the internal efficiencies of the communities: by comparing them between each other 450 the dramatic difference between the London community C8 and the rest of the system becomes apparent. The 451
London community has an efficiency of 0.079 while the other communities have an average efficiency of 0.016. 452
Further, by comparing the off-diagonal elements of a column or row to the corresponding diagonal element it is 453 possible to assess the relative efficiency between the internal and external operations of a community and how 454 this ratio compares with the other communities. While for all other communities the ratio between the internal and 455 the average external efficiency is between 2 and 3, the London community scores a value of 8.2, highlighting 456 once again its superior level of internal connectivity. 457 Table 5 provides, for each community, the nodes with the highest values of IC and EC. The results for the whole 458 system are presented in Figure 10 . The differences and the analogies in the outcome of the global and the 459 community-based analyses can be assessed by comparing the elements of Table 5 to the most critical nodes 460 according to GC (Table 3 and Figure 5 , or GC rank column in Table 5 ). Some nodes critical at the global level, 461 for example, also emerge as local hubs. These are King's Cross in London, Preston in the North-West of 462
England and Exeter in the South-West. Further, the community centrality analysis also embeds system-wide 463 information: the nodes of Reading and Stratford show the highest EC in their respective communities because of 464 their vicinity to the London community C8, which is a hub for the long-range efficient transport. 465
The community centrality analysis however, yields new information: nodes such as Ashford (128) in the South or 466 Newcastle (22) in the North are the most central for the internal operations of their communities, although they 467 only rank 41 st and 57 th in terms of global information centrality. Disruptions to these two nodes have serious 468 consequences at the local level: disregarding those means neglecting the needs of the stakeholders that operate 469 at the community level. It is also interesting to note that in South-East, South-West and North-West communities 470 (C1, C7 and C9) the nodes ranking the highest in terms of IC (Nodes 128, 135 and 135 respectively) are also the 471 most critical node when assessed for EC. Not only any disruption to those nodes would markedly reduce the 472 internal performance of the community where they belong, but it would also impair the efficiency of service 473 delivery between those communities and the rest of the system. 474
The EC results highlight the role of the London community C8 as a hub of whole-system connectivity: the highest-475 ranking node in all of the adjacent communities is a direct neighbour to the London community. In absolute 476 terms, the highest value of EC is obtained for Node 100, at the interface between communities C8 and the East 477 of England community C5. This community has a single point of connection with the rest of the system, and this 478 situation is unique in the network, as all other communities are connected in several positions due to the meshed 479 structure of the railway system. The result is a value of EC = 8.41% for the London community and 6.88% for the 480 East of England community, both substantially above those obtained for the other communities. The opposite is 481 true for the station of Darlington in the Scotland community C4: the community is very remote and presents two 482 equally valid alternative group of paths (on the East and West coast) to reach the southern regions of the 483 network. This means any disruption to either has very little consequences on the efficiency of communication 484 with the rest of the system, with EC = 1.7%. 485
CROSS-SCALE CENTRALITY AND CRITICAL ELEMENTS
486
The community centrality analysis performed for partition P4 and illustrated above was replicated for the other 487 five partitions identified with community detection, and the results were combined in the cross-scale centrality 488
indicator XC in an effort to trace the criticality of the different infrastructure assets at multiple scales. The relative 489 contributions of IC and EC towards XC depends on the  coefficient and the partition weights. Every partition 490 was equally weighted, while three different values of , equal to 0, 0.5 and 1, were considered. 491 Table 6 provides the results of a cross-scale centrality analysis by reporting the 10 nodes reaching the highest 492 XC values for three different values of. Some nodes attain high levels of XC independently of the  value 493 selected for the assessment. This is the case of nodes 135, 98, 32 and 105: these nodes represent true 494 criticalities within the system, governing its efficiency at multiple scales of description, within and across 495 communities. As a whole, however, the list of the top 10 nodes by XC presented in Table 6 inevitably changes 496 for different . Higher values rank more heavily the nodes governing local efficiency of communities, such as 497 nodes 16, 22 or 49. The opposite is true for nodes such as 55, 52 or 28, which are not central for the efficiency of 498 connections within their community, but reach high levels of EC across different partitions, and this results in high 499 XC scores for lower values of .
500
The use of XC in a multi-stakeholder environment is exemplified in the following. Let us assume that there are 501 three stakeholders concerned with the assessment of the railway network. The first consists of municipal 502 authorities (A) interested with the functionality of the network at the County scale (P1), because that maps to the 503 needs of their constituencies. The second is Network Rail (B), which manages the network by routes that 504 coarsely correspond to the regions of Great Britain (P4) and needs to allocate resources to each of them. The 505 third and last one is the Office of Rail and Road (C), which needs to assess the performance of the system as a 506 whole. When evaluating the criticality of every asset within the network, the stakeholders in Group A use XC that 507 is the weighted average of IC and EC computed on the communities of P1 to assess the impact on the 508 functionality of communities from the impairment of each node. Stakeholder B uses the same metrics but 509 computed on the communities of P4, while Stakeholder C, concerned with the whole system, uses the outcome 510 of a global analysis: GC. This produces a different ranking for the criticality of the individual network components, 511 because stakeholders defined criticality at different scales. The Spearman correlation coefficient of the three 512 rankings are, respectively AB = 0.82, AC = 0.81 and BC = 0.85, indicating that while there is disagreement in 513 the prioritisation of the different nodes, there also are some converging interests. Aggregating the local analyses 514 using cross-scale centrality XC and comparing these values with their GC score (Fig. 11 ) allows for a transparent 515 evaluation of the needs of the three stakeholders, identifying the assets that are of interest to all of them and the 516 ones where there is disagreement. 517
The horizontal axis of Fig. 11 expresses how much every node affects the global behaviour of the system, while 518 the vertical one synthesises the importance of nodes across the (possibly many) local descriptions of the network 519 performance yielded by IC and EC at different scales. This way, no information is neglected and this can be used 520 to facilitate discussion about resource allocation among the three stakeholder groups. 521
It is possible to identify nodes such as Exeter or King's Cross (Nodes 135 and 99) which fall into a high-priority 522 class (red nodes -Q1) for everyone, as they achieve high values of both GC and XC. Not only these are critical 523 at the global level, but their removal jeopardises the efficiency of their communities at multiple scales. The 524 opposite is true for nodes falling in the low GC -low XC group (purple nodes -Q3): nodes such as 31 525 (Blackpool) are peripheral for the whole system and smaller communities are not dramatically affected by any 526 disruption to them. 527 Nodes in the low GC -high XC quadrant (green nodes -Q2), represent a more interesting case. Nodes such as 528 117, representing the station of Ramsgate, do not attain high scores in a global analysis, due to the 529 redundancies of the system that can cope well with their removal. If they are evaluated from a local perspective, 530 however, they stand out as those nodes that can compromise the efficiency of the communities they belong to. 531
The system owner (in this case, the Office of Rail and Road) should treat these elements with caution, as 532 stakeholders concerned with local operations may consider them to be of the highest importance. Those nodes 533 falling in the high GC -low XC region (blue nodes -Q4), represent the final case: elements such as Node 58, 534 which models the station of Sheffield, are a concern for the system operator, but their importance can be 535 downplayed by local stakeholders such as municipal authorities. 536 CONCLUSION 537 Global assessments of criticality fail to identify the system elements governing the service delivery performance 538 at the local level, as this is governed by short-range interactions between neighbouring elements. Community 539 detection forms the basis of new metrics that play a central role in the new approach. The first metric, 540 intracommunity centrality, IC, accounts for the efficiency loss within a community that follows the removal of a 541 node. The second, intercommunity centrality, EC, maps the efficiency loss between that community and the rest 542 of the network. 543
Larger communities generate lower values of IC and EC for individual nodes indicating that the nodes are more 544 disposable. IC is influenced by both the internal average degree of its communities, as well as by their external 545 average degree. For sparse networks, adding edges between communities can be more efficient than adding 546 edges within communities, if the objective is to reduce IC across the board. EC is influenced by the number of 547 communities within the network and the external average degree of their nodes. At the same time, the internal 548 average degree plays a role as it allows for the bypassing of internal bottlenecks. 549 A third metric, cross-scale centrality, XC, combines the IC and EC scores obtained by the network nodes to 550 enable an assessment of their criticality accounting for the role they play at all the meaningful scales of system 551 description. XC can be tuned to account more heavily for IC or EC, depending on the objective of the specific 552 analysis. Used in conjunction to global indicators such as GC, cross-scale centrality allows for a synthesis of the 553 information for decision-making. 554
A global analysis of the railway network of Great Britain reveals that most of the high-centrality nodes are located 555 in London or immediately around it. The application of the new community centrality metrics, however, shows 556 that, at the local level, some peripheral nodes can be just as critical. This information was suppressed by the 557 global average used to compute GC, but is restored with the use of IC. EC, on the other hand, accounts for long-558 range interaction within communities, thus restoring a global perspective in the community-based assessment. IC 559 and EC obtained at different scales are then combined in the XC indicator. By using XC in conjunction with the 560 outcome of the global analysis some low GC nodes, although neglected by global assessments, emerge as 561 having the potential to be mission-critical for a wide variety of stakeholders concerned with local performance. 562
While the approach presented in this paper facilitates the identification of critical elements and provides decision-563 makers with tools to explore the local behaviour of infrastructure systems at multiple scales, in future work it will 564 be expanded to include multiple contingencies, other indicators of service delivery and interactions with the 565 natural hazards threatening the performance of the network and that of its communities. 566 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 567
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APPENDIX A
769
Mapping of the nodes of the network in the (GC, XC) plane. The dash-dotted lines represent the 770 median of the distribution of the two variables, and were used to separate the nodes in four 771 quadrants. Q1 includes nodes critical in local and global assessments, Q2 nodes which are critical 772 only in local assessments, Q3 contains the peripheral nodes, while Q4 hosts those nodes that are 773 critical for global efficiency but not at the local level. 
